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Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act:
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An Analogy
with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the
Protection Available in the European Community.
By Silvia Beltrametti *
“You may imitate but never counterfeit.”
Honoré De Balzac
¶1

Is the Design Piracy Prohibition Act a necessary addition to the Intellectual
Property panorama of the United States? American designers and other creative minds
do not have any means to protect their innovative design creations because none of the
existing intellectual property measures can be tailored to the protection of design rights.
To explore this issue, I go back to the underlying reasons for prohibiting the trade of
counterfeit goods and I argue that counterfeiting and design piracy are analytically
similar and there is no reason justifying a different legal treatment of these two issues,
especially given the close interrelation of these two phenomena. After demonstrating that
the current intellectual property measures are inadequate for the protection of design
rights, I provide arguments for the need of such protection and include a full analysis of
the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. Finally, I compare the Design Piracy Prohibition Act
with the European design protection system and argue that much can be gained from
looking at the European experience.
I. ISSUES

¶2

By passing the Counterfeiting Act in 1984, Congress explicitly acknowledged the
evils of counterfeiting and imposed severe penalties on activities associated with it.
Counterfeiting involves the use of a spurious trademark on non-original merchandise,
most frequently on clothes and fashion accessories, such as bags and sunglasses. The
fake labels and logos are usually applied on copies of products that have proved
successful in the market. This means that before the logo is applied to a product, the
design of the real item has to be copied. The copy of a design is in fact a counterfeit
without a label, but not legally recognized as such. The aim of this paper is to illustrate
the need for the protection of fashion designs.

*
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helpful comments and encouragement. I am also thankful for the help of Nikhil Abraham, Lawrence
Apolzon, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Tony Bangs, Alan D’Ambrosio, Paul Heald, Sheila Henderson,
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University of Chicago for sharing their comments.
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The fashion design industry in the U.S. is part of intellectual property’s negative
space as fashion designs do not per se enjoy intellectual property protection.
Explanations for the existence of this negative space rely mainly on public choice theory;
historically, intellectual property legislation was enacted when a sufficiently wellorganized and well-funded group lobbied for protection without potent opposition.
Although Congress considered up to seventy bills advocating some form of legal
protection for fashion designs since 1914, 1 the major reason for refraining from enacting
legislation directly covering design rights has been lethargy and lack of coordination of a
united voice within the fashion community. Its fast-moving nature and peculiar creative
dynamics are also part of the reason why fashion is one of the few innovative industries
that is not protected by tailored intellectual property laws. Given the lack of a legal tool
designed for the exclusive enforcement of clothing and fashion accessory designs,
designers have to rely on the existing copyright protection, occasionally on trade-dress,
and otherwise on design patents. However, these standard intellectual property options
are only capable of offering a rather uncertain protection and can be cumbersome and
time-consuming to attain.
On the other side of the Atlantic, in the European Union, a well grounded system
for design protection has been in place since 2002. This system grants a two-tier
protection to registered and unregistered designs. The winning weapon in the European
scenario is the protection for unregistered designs: without the need to register, designers
have the choice of enforcing their rights. It has been argued that the paucity of cases that
make it to court testifies to the fact that designers do not really insist on applying their
rights. This is not necessarily true, but is rather a sign that design disputes are resolved
through confidential settlements. However, this trend is slowly changing as two strong
precedents have been laid down recently.
Partly to reach some sort of alignment with European design protection and partly
to comply with the public policy goal of rewarding effort and incentivizing innovation,
the Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA) was introduced in the U.S. in 2006. There is a
lot of controversy around the proposed legislation, which is still pending in Congress.
This paper will demonstrate that the DPPA is a good start for the introduction of design
rights in the U.S. even if some aspects would have to be revised. Although this measure
is a less powerful tool than its European counterpart, much can be gained from looking at
the European experience and even if historically the Americans have a more litigious
nature, in the end it is difficult not to see how this bill would improve the legal scenario
governing the fashion industry in the U.S. The rapid pace of technological innovation
enables faster copying in larger quantities at the expense of creative design, and makes
the present low IP equilibrium no longer justifiable. In addition, in this challenging
economic environment, the current inadequacies that reward copycats and act as a
1

Anya Jenkins Ferris, Comment, Real Art Calls For Real Legislation: An Argument Against Adoption
Of The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559, 564 (2008). See also Susan
Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH, 119-121 (2006) for a historical account of the most important acts designed to protect textile and
clothing designs considered by Congress over the 20th century, the most important ones being the 1913
Kahn act and the 1926 Vestal Bill. See Maurice A. Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 246-56 (1944) and
Self-Protection of Design Creation in the Millinery Industry, 49 YALE L.J. 1290 (1940) for a description of
other forms of action taken by U.S. clothing and textile manufacturers to supplement the lobbying efforts to
achieve design protection—like the establishment of the Fashion Originator’s Guild of America in 1932.
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disincentive to creators negatively impact the ability of American designers to compete in
the global market.
I will deal with the issues raised above in the following order. First, in section II, I
suggest that there is no rationale in distinguishing counterfeiting from design piracy.
After that, in section III, I inspect to what extent the current intellectual property laws
available in the U.S. are capable of protecting clothing designs and fashion accessories.
In section IV, I put forward the reasons in favor of passing the DPPA, and in section V, I
analyze the proposed piece of legislation and its shortcomings. In section VI, I explain
how the framework of the DPPA could gain by bringing its legal standards closer to the
ones set out in the European Regulation on Design Rights. Finally, I conclude that, for
the time being, the DPPA is an appropriate and non-excessive initiative, but that, in the
long run, more needs to be done in order to achieve optimal protection for the design
industry.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT AND ANALOGIES WITH COUNTERFEITING

¶7

¶8

The U.S. Constitution permits the protection of intellectual property of U.S.
citizens who deserve to reap the benefits of their creativity and inventions: Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the progress of science and
useful arts.” 2 Congress can award exclusive rights for a limited amount of time to
compensate creators and inventors for the time and effort they devoted to their own
intellectual investments, as this will ensure the development of creative industries. This
type of incentive is thought to be crucial for America to maintain a leading position for
innovation in the global marketplace. 3 Although the constitutional standpoint emphasizes
that it is creative individuals and not the financial well-being of the fashion industry that
has to be protected, the mechanism of giving out intellectual property protection should
not occur automatically. It is crucial that rights are given out when clear benefits are
present and the economic growth of the country is not adversely affected.
Piracy means taking somebody’s design and replicating it in such manner that
nobody would know the difference between the original and the copy, and passing off the
copy as the original. That is clearly wrong and the law must address it. The lack of legal
protection for fashion designs is odd, especially if we think of design piracy as a similar,
but in many ways more subtle beast than counterfeiting. Counterfeiting involves the
“knowing use of a spurious mark which is identical with or substantially
indistinguishable from a registered trademark, in connection with the trafficking of
counterfeit merchandise.” 4 Usually, “counterfeit merchandise is made so as to imitate a
2

U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also ROBERT DESTY & ALBERT BRUNNER, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 22 (2d ed. Sumner Whitney, 1884).
3
Intellectual property makes up more than half of all U.S. exports, driving 40% of the country's growth.
See http://www.uschamber.com/IP.htm (last visited on Mar. 13, 2010). U.S. intellectual property is worth
$5-5.5 trillion - more than the gross domestic product (GDP) of any other country. See
http://washingtontechnology.org/community/forums/post/628.aspx (last visited on Mar. 13, 2010).
According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, intellectual property in this country is worth more than
$5 trillion - about twice the amount of the current federal budget. See Sean Silverthrone, Monetizing IP:
The Executive's Challenge, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING KNOWLEDGE (June 9, 2008), available
at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pdf/item/5925.pdf.
4
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, §1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178 (1984).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2008) (for definitions); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d) (2008) (for civil actions); 18 U.S.C.
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well-known product in all details of construction . . . .” 5 Also, within the realm of
fashion, counterfeiting generally starts with design piracy: before a counterfeited
trademark is applied to a bag or piece of clothing its design must first be copied. A copy
of a design is really a counterfeit without the label. If no design piracy existed, there
would probably be no counterfeiting. Piracy and counterfeiting are in many ways
interrelated and both deserve to be addressed by effective legislative measures, otherwise
a young designer with no brand recognition is left defenseless against the problem of
piracy, and famous designers will only be protected if, in addition to their designs, their
trademarked labels are taken too.
Congress has responded to the threat of counterfeiting with various legal
measures. 6 Among them is the Counterfeiting Act of 1984, which imposes severe
penalties on counterfeiting charges. Counterfeit remedies include criminal penalties, ex
parte civil seizure orders and statutory damages, as well as mandatory attorney’s fees and
treble damages. It is to be noted that the remedies listed above apply absent “extenuating
circumstances” where the use of the counterfeit mark was intentional, in which case the
legal treatment can be even harsher. 7 These severe punitive measures go far beyond
remedying the usual harms of a trademark owner, such as diverted sales, loss of goodwill
and reputation and dilution of the mark’s distinctiveness. They exist to redress other
potentially more far reaching injuries to the public. 8 Counterfeit operations have a very
serious effect on the global economy, such as lost jobs and tax revenues and, in addition,
counterfeited items can pose a substantial threat to health and safety. Just think of a
children’s dress made of highly flammable fabric or eyeglasses made of toxic material.
There is also evidence linking counterfeit activities to organized crime and terrorist
organizations, which use counterfeiting as a money laundering and funding device. 9
These illegal economies that thrive under globalization, and on which consumers
unwittingly feed, explain the need for the far reaching legal measures imposed on product
counterfeiting, a $250 billion business that translates into 750,000 lost jobs.10
§2320 (2008) (for further statutory and criminal remedies).
5
5A J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.01 (3d ed.
1992).
6
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2008), allows the U.S. to sanction countries
that fail to provide “the right of establishment or protection of intellectual property rights.” The
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996), imposes
liability on to those who unknowingly or unintentionally participate in the importation of goods, including
attorney’s, CPA’s, freight forwarders, custom’s brokers, etc. See also Copyright Felony Act, Pub. L. No.
102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1994); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. 91-452, 84
Stat. 941 (1970); Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
7
Id.
8
GINSBURG, LITMAN & KELVIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 958 (Foundation Press,
4th ed. 2007).
9
See The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, http://www.iacc.org (last visited on Mar. 13,
2010); Barbara Kolsum, Global Enforcement, 517 PLI/PAT 533 (1998); Bruce Siegal, Developments in
Counterfeiting Legislation Enforcement, 468 PLI/PAT 441, 453 (1997); Katherine C. Spelman, Combating
Counterfeiting, 417 PLI/PAT 309, 337 (1995) (“counterfeiting has become a core activity for organized
crime because of the big rewards and low risk of prosecution”).
10
Data taken from http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2006/september/06-158.htm (last visited
on Mar. 23, 2010) (“Counterfeiting and piracy cost the U.S. economy more than $250 billion a year and an
estimated 750,000 jobs,” said David Hirschmann, senior vice president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.). See also The Spread of Counterfeiting: Knock-offs Catch On, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15610089. The
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Sophisticated counterfeiting strategies do not only operate in a domestic ambit,
they operate globally. This is the result of the unprecedented rise of technology that we
have been witnessing in the past decade. The widespread use of scanners, laser copiers
and the Internet enable counterfeiters and pirates in developing countries to copy and
manufacture products even before the original items hit the market. Counterfeiters
thereby free-ride on the enormous investments that designers have incurred launching
new brands and design collections. Counterfeiting must be addressed on an international
level since often the copies of the original goods are produced in countries where labor is
cheap, and then imported into other countries. There have been several responses to this
global problem. For example, customs cooperation measures between many countries
are in place to stop the entry of counterfeit goods at the boarders, and the advent of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) together with the implementation of its Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) have forced many
countries around the world to recognize the value that lies in the protection of intellectual
property rights and the necessity to combat counterfeiting on a global scale. 11 Although
much remains to be done in terms of effective enforcement, many underdeveloped
countries started to understand that they have a vested interest in protecting intellectual
property rights because it attracts foreign investment.
¶11
Counterfeiting and design piracy are analytically similar and to a certain extent
complementary problems developing in the same globalized world. Oddly, the former
one is legally prohibited while the latter one is not. There is no reason why this different
treatment of similar issues should continue, especially given the close interrelation of
these two phenomena. In some instances, not only does the legal copying of fashion
designs harm their creators, it also provides manufacturers with a mechanism for
circumventing the current campaign against counterfeit trademarks. U.S. Customs are
entitled to stop, seize and destroy fake trademarked apparel and accessories entering the
U.S. If, however, the same items are shipped without labels, they can freely enter the
country. In this scenario, distributors attach the counterfeit labels and logos at a later
stage, once the goods are inside the country, so that there is less chance of detection by
law enforcement. The continued exclusion of most fashion designs from IP protection
thus undermines federal policy with respect to trademarks by perpetuating a loophole in
the intellectual property law system.

Economist reported that
The OECD estimates that the international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods was
worth around $250 billion in 2007. The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition
(IACC), a lobby group, says the true figure is actually closer to $600 billion, because the
OECD’s estimate does not include online piracy or counterfeits that are sold in the same
country as they are made. Counterfeit goods make up 5-7% of world trade, according to
the IACC. In 2008, the value of fake goods seized at America’s borders increased by
nearly 40% over the year before. It subsequently fell by 4% last year—far less than the
25% decline in imports overall.”).
Id.
11
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is Annex 1C of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), signed in Marrakesh, Morocco
on April 15, 1994. Part II of TRIPS sets out standards concerning the availability, scope and use of
intellectual property rights and Part III specifically deals with enforcement measures. See also World
Trade Organization, WTO Trade Topics: Textiles Monitory Body (TMB),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm (last visited on Mar. 27, 2010).
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Similar legal standards should apply in similar instances. Both counterfeiting and
design piracy involve illicit imitations that deny a creator the fruits of his labor.
Intellectual efforts are being copied and exploited without permission and to the
detriment of the legitimate owner. These analogies justify the introduction of intellectual
property protection for design rights. Of course granting only the right is not enough;
enforcement and an effective court system that deals with violations must be put in place
in order to create an efficient mechanism of protection. In addition, cooperation with the
industry in order to combine enforcement efforts can be crucial to understand the real
need for legislation and the best way to implement rules. Once this is in place, a wider
global cooperation to tackle the piracy problem with harmonized regulations can be
envisaged. This can be done by building on the enforcement mechanisms of national and
international anti-counterfeiting measures already in place.
¶13
The absence of proper intellectual property rights that give designers standing to
enforce their rights gives rise to trade distortion. If counterfeited items are prohibited,
pirated design copies deserve the same treatment. The bottom line is the same: in both
cases, the losses created are passed on in the form of higher prices and increasingly
consumers are being exposed to dangerous materials from which the copies are made. A
myriad of reasons have been brought forward for the legal prohibition of counterfeiting—
there is no reason why they should not apply to design piracy too. 12
III. CURRENT DESIGN PROTECTION IN THE U.S.
¶14

In the United States, designers currently rely on three existing forms of protection:
copyright, trade dress, and design patents. I will now proceed to illustrate the scope of
these existing measures.
A. Copyright

¶15

United States copyright laws protect original forms of expressions fixed in a
tangible medium for the life of the author plus 70 years. 13 Copyright protection covers
diverse works such as literature, art, music and architectural drawings, and if the
originality threshold is met, it punishes the creation of substantially similar works. 14 One
would think that fashion designs are encompassed, 15 but this is not the case given the
existence of a long established doctrine know as the “utilitarian doctrine” which prohibits
the extension of copyright protection to useful articles. Allowing copyright protection of
useful articles raises legitimate concerns as it has the potential of resulting in far-reaching
competitive advantages, but whether this is the case in the fashion design industry is
12

There may be some theoretical economic arguments in favour of counterfeiting. For example, one
may argue that counterfeiting puts downward pressure on prices, which ultimately benefits consumers.
However, the main argument here is that design piracy should be treated the same way as counterfeiting,
not to argue for the legal prohibition of counterfeiting per se.
13
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended the term of copyright protection for most
works to life plus 70 years. See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending chapter 3, title 17,
U.S.C., to extend the term of copyright protection for most works to life plus 70 years).
14
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2008).
15
This statement is made following the reasoning by analogy approach. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 is
clear in showing that legislative history specifically excluded “ladies’ dress” from the subject matter of
copyright law.
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debatable. Consumer choice seems to attach more importance to the aesthetics of a
clothing design, and the status and prestige the design confers, rather than its functional
aspects.
¶16
In any case, the Copyright Act is clear: copyright doctrine protects original works
insofar as their form but not their utilitarian aspects are concerned. 16 One way to secure
some protection is to separate original artistic parts from functional ones: designs of
useful articles shall be protected only to the extent that they incorporate pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features that are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects
of the same article. 17 The fact that a useful article is attractively shaped does not render it
eligible for copyright protection; only some non-useful features, which can be identified
separately, might qualify for protection. 18 This involves a considerable degree of
physical or at least conceptual separability.
¶17
It follows that some design elements, such as original fabric designs, have the
potential of being the adequate subject for copyright protection, but clothing designs do
not because their shapes are considered to have the primary utilitarian functions of
covering the human body and keeping it warm. 19 In most cases, fashion designs fail the
separability test because creative expression is extrinsically compounded with practical
utility. 20 As one court concisely put it when addressing fashion designs’ copyrightability:
“artistic and utilitarian elements are conceptually indivisible and, therefore, not
copyrightable subject matter.” 21 In the recent case of Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating
Co. 22 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that casino uniforms could not be
copyrighted because the aesthetic value of clothing cannot conceptually be separated
from its utilitarian function, namely the necessity of wearing it to perform one’s job
adequately.
¶18
It is going to be very difficult to succeed in proving separability between the design
and its utility. Only a few design piracy cases have been pursued under this legal theory,
and only the most egregious cases have been successful. 23 In Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl 24 the majority held that the metal belt buckles designed by Barry
16

Id.
Id.
18
37 C.F.R. §202.10 (c) (1959), revoked on Jan. 1, 1978 by 43 Fed. Reg. 966 (1978) and codified in the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101.
19
The Copyright Act 1976 allows for the copyrightability of patterns but until then the applicable
principles of law were set out in Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). Cheney
was in the business of producing silk fabric and Doris copied Cheney's patterns. The Trial court found for
Doris and the Appellate Court affirmed because at the time the Copyright Office was not accepting
“patterns” as copyrightable subject matter. The Appellate Court held that although Cheney had suffered
harm no remedy did exist at common law and that it was up to the legislature to amend copyright law to
address the issue.
20
MELVIN B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 2.08[B][3]. Nimmer differentiates between fabric
designs and dress designs and concludes that fabric designs are generally copyrightable since they could be
marketable as art but clothing designs are not. See also Olivera Medenica, Designers Seek to Prevent
Cheaper Knockoffs, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 2006. In Marzer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme
Court found that some ceramic statues at the base of a mass-produced lamp were eligible for copyright
protection as they were separable from the functional aspects of the lamp.
21
Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2005).
22
Id.
23
In Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984), the Court awarded copyright protection to a
swimsuit design that was so elaborately crafted it had little chance of being worn.
24
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1980).
17
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Kieselstein reached out to the level of creative art, 25 but the position of the dissenting
judge was unbendable: “Innovations of form are inseparable from the more important
function they serve—helping to keep the tops of trousers at waist level.” 26
¶19
This further exemplifies that copyright would only protect against unauthorized use
and copying of artistic elements that exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the
article. The protection is limited to design elements such as individual patterns as well as
fabric collections that present some elements of originality. 27 The threshold for
originality is low, only some minimum degree of creativity has to be displayed.
Copyright registration in the U.S. is a straightforward process only requiring filing a short
application and paying a nominal fee. 28
¶20
Over the past few years, designers have become more aggressive in pursuing
infringers that are knocking-off their fabric designs. As of October 2007, Forever 21, a
fast-fashion merchandiser making a business out of copying high-end designers, has been
the target of more than 20 lawsuits; some of them have been settled and others are still
pending. 29 Designers Diane von Fürstenberg and Anne Sui seem to be very keen on
enforcing their copyrights in fabric design as this is currently a powerful tool to succeed
against copiers. 30
B. Trade Dress
¶21

The protection of trade dress, as governed by the Lanham Act, encompasses design
and appearance of a product together with the elements making up the overall image that
serves to identify the product presented to the consumer. 31 To successfully pursue a
claim for trade dress infringement a design must be non-functional, it must have acquired
secondary meaning or be inherently distinctive, and its appropriation must be likely to
cause confusion as to the origin of the product. 32 Although far from easy, proving the
non-functionality requirement is not as lethal as the “utilitarian” aspect of copyright law,
and fashion designs are likelier to overcome this hurdle under this legal theory.
¶22
The real challenge lies in proving inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning.
This is further complicated by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Samara Brothers v.
Wal-Mart, 33 where the Court held that clothing designs are very rarely inherently
distinctive and that distinctiveness would always require proof of secondary meaning, in
the sense that consumers must regard the design feature as indicating the source of the
25

Id.
Id.
27
In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytags Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995), the Court held that pattern can be
protected as “writing or prints” under the Copyright Act.
28
Forty-five dollars for a basic registration or thirty-five dollars if registration is filed online. United
States Copyright Office, Fees, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited on Apr. 18, 2010).
29
Lisa Pearson et al., From Fashion Catwalks to the Courts, COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 2008, at 23; see
also Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STANFORD L. REV.
1147, 1174 (2009).
30
Forever 21’s $32 “Sabrina” smock dress looks suspiciously similar to Diane Fürstenberg’s $325
“Cerisier” design, but the only way Diane von Fürstenberg could prove her rights was by asserting her
copyright in the fabric of the dress.
31
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
32
JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE §
2A.01[1] (2006).
33
Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1998).
26
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item. This seems to imply that, in order to be protected under §43(a) of the Lanham Act,
a design needs to symbolize a unique source identifier. The Court’s ruling in Samara
Brothers severely limited the scope of intellectual property protection for clothing
designs under the trade dress heading, since the short life span of “clothing’s
marketability more or less precludes its attaining a secondary meaning until the item is no
longer in fashion, at which point a suit to protect would be meaningless.” 34 The Court
acknowledged that most fashion designs are of volatile nature and are not intended to
identify source but rather to render products more appealing. He distinguishes packaging
design, which usually is an automatic indicator of origin and therefore protected under
§43(a) of the Lanham Act, from fashion design, which mainly appeals for its aesthetic
function. Although the Court did not carry this argument out any further, the thinking
that the appeal of fashion designs lies in their aesthetic function seems to suggest that
innovative designs are often insufficient proof of source for customers. Many designers
have attempted to secure their creative work for an entire garment under trade dress
protection, arguing that the product’s overall image justifies protection because it
qualifies as a source of origin, 35 but following the Samara ruling, only a few have been
successful. In Coach Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., 36 Coach was able to introduce enough
evidence showing that its handbag design had gained secondary meaning: satisfactory
expert testimony, consumer surveys and evidence of advertising. The Coach case is the
exception that confirms the rule: only in very rare circumstances will fashion design be
source-identifying as this is a very high standard for a product to meet.
C. Design Patents
¶23

In order to have a valid design patent the claimed design depicted in the drawings
must be “novel, non-obvious and non-functional ornamental design for an article of
manufacture.” 37 Design patents grant their inventors a monopoly over their innovative
designs by giving them the exclusive right to manufacture, use and sell the patented
design for a term of 14 years from issuance. However, the difficulties in meeting the
requirements for this form of protection with respect to fashion design are many. Strict
standards apply. Considering that most fashion designs consist of slight variations of
articles of clothing already on the market, the standard of non-obviousness can be very
hard to meet. The design has to be non-obvious in the eyes of someone skilled in the art,
a fashion designer in this case. If these obstacles are overcome, the protection granted is
far-reaching, 38 but at the expense of time and money. It takes an average of two years to
receive approval (or a rejection) from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
and the cost of a design patent application together with government fees and the added
costs of a design patent attorney can amount to several thousand dollars. 39 In a fast34
Samantha L. Hetherington, Fashion Runways Are No Longer The Public Domain: Applying The
Common Law Right Of Publicity To Haute Couture Fashion Design, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 43,
55 (2001).
35
Id. at 58.
36
Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., No. 99 Civ. 11672, 2001 WL 812126, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 18,
2001).
37
35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (1988).
38
Id. Design patents last for 14 years.
39
According to 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(b)(1) and Fee Code 1012/2012, the basic filing fee for a design patent
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moving industry where the success of a particular design cannot be accurately predicted,
companies are reluctant to invest large sums ex ante. Jimmy Choo, a fashion house that
is generally very keen on protecting its intellectual property rights and started to build up
a design patent portfolio several years ago, now owns about 270 issued design patents. 40
About 50 of those relate to bags, but the majority, approximately 170 designs, relate to
shoes. However, most luxury fashion-houses still do not have any design patents as the
overall process is too cumbersome and the prospects of protection are too uncertain given
that the USPTO rejects roughly half of the applications that are filed. Additionally,
design patent infringement is found in only approximately half of the cases brought to
court. 41
D. Evaluation of the Current Protection
¶24

There is no magic bullet for the protection of design rights. A remedy can be
sought within the patchwork of protections, which typically apply only to a limited aspect
of the design and for too long a term to fit a fast-moving industry. 42 As I have explained
above, the scope of protection afforded by each of these areas may differ significantly,
and it is often difficult to foresee and select the form of protection that will provide the
broadest scope of rights. Notably, judges have shown a very narrow attitude when the
protection of fashion designs is at stake, and they have always tried to keep their
interpretations as tight as possible. The case law reviewed above has shown that, most of
the time, courts recognized only clothes’ utilitarian function in the ambit of copyright and
refused to find indication of source in the realm of trade dress. This is indicative of the
courts’ unwillingness to apply intellectual property protection to fashion designs in the
absence of a clear authorization to do so. There is some wiggle room, but it can only lead
to uncertainty and inconsistent predictions so that one might say with enough confidence
that the legal remedies currently available are insufficient to grant fashion designs
adequate intellectual property protection. 43

filed on or after December 8, 2004 is $220 and $110 for small entities. Following 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(b) the
issuance fees of $860 and $430 for small entities must be paid. Julie P. Tsai, Comment, Fashioning
Protection: A Note on the Protection of Fashion Designs in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
447, 457 (2005), notes that the average attorney fees amount to $1,100 per design.
40
At the time of writing, January 2009, an extensive search was performed on United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Images Database at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.
41
Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for Improving Industrial Design
Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 555 (1999).
42
In this sentence “too long a term” refers to the long terms of years that the current intellectual property
options cover. As mentioned above, copyright protection lasts for 70 years post mortem autorem, a design
patent for 14 years, and a trade dress for as long as it is used/renewed. Tsai, supra note 39 (arguing that 14
years of protection for design patents is excessive for protecting fashion works that have a short life span).
43
Another interestingly related argument is explored by Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, supra note 29
(“Designers who are protected by trademark and trade dress innovate in ways that play to these legal

advantages. The resulting effect on the direction of innovation is to favor innovation by designers who
already enjoy existing protection by other aspects of intellectual property law, over innovation by
designers—particularly small, new designers—who are not thus protected. The existence of some kinds of
intellectual property protection combined with the absence of design protection also gives designers the
incentive to create some kinds of products over others.”).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN PIRACY PROHIBITION ACT
¶25

The Design Piracy Prohibition Act (“DPPA”), originally introduced by
Congressman Bob Goodlatte in the House of Representatives on Mach 30, 2006, is
intended to fill in the gap by amending Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act of 1976 so as to
encompass fashion designs. 44 In short, the DPPA would allow a designer to photograph a
garment, digitally archive it, and register it for copyright protection for a nominal fee. 45
A. Is There Need for This Legislation

¶26

There is a need for legislation because the numbers show that design piracy is
harming the design industry and consumers. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates
that $12 billion in revenues were lost in 2006 because of piracy of apparel and fashion
goods accounting for 5% of the nation’s $196 billion apparel market. 46 The numbers in
this study also include counterfeited items as usually every counterfeit garment starts as a
pirated design—the real figure could actually be much higher due to the fact that design
piracy is not outlawed. However, the nature and the extent of the harm suffered by
fashion designers due to the lack of legal protection is demonstrated not only in the
economic loss of the fashion market, but also in the loss of goodwill and dilution which
are not reflected by the above numbers.
¶27
The fact that the DPPA is stalled in Congress shows that the U.S. fashion world is
split on the issue. There is a sharp divide among legal scholars and representative
members of the fashion community as to the potential benefits of the DPPA.
Representatives of the California Fashion Association argue that if the bill is passed,
designers’ inspiration would be stifled and many retailers would be exposed to frivolous
lawsuits that would drive them out of business. On the other side, designer-supporting
organizations, such as the Council of Fashion Design America and the New York Council
of Fashion Design, clearly support the initiative; many designers, among them Narciso
Rodriguez, Diane von Fürstenberg and Zac Posen, complain that their designs have been
pirated so much that their value is now diluted and their reputation damaged. 47 Other big
44
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006). The proposed legislation would
amend chapter 13 of title 17 of the United States Code. The change will be de minimis: the words “article
of apparel” at § 1301 (b) would include fashion designs within the scope of copyright protection. In
addition it would just be another exception to the utilitarian doctrine, see vessel hulls and architectural
designs.
45
The exact amount is unclear as different sources give different values, but it will lie somewhere
between $50 and $100.
46
The U.S. Apparel Market 2007 Dresses Up . . . Way Up, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 18, 2008 (U.S. apparel sales
reached $196 billion in 2007), available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_080318.html.
Definite numbers on the costs of counterfeiting are hard to come by, but one study entitled “Economic
Analysis of the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Initiative” prepared for the Coalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP) by LECG, November 2007 states that “the lost revenues due to
counterfeiting and piracy of the apparel and fashion industry are estimated to be about $12 billion
annually.” For more thorough information and market analysis figures on the Apparel Market in the United
States, see Trends – An Annual Statistical Analysis of the U.S. Apparel and Footwear Industries, Compiled
on Behalf of AAFA in Part By Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg. Annual Reports for years 2005, 2006, 2007
available at http://www.apparelandfootwear.org/Statistics.asp (last visited on Mar. 18, 2010). See also
Maggie Overfelt, When Piracy Is Legal, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/23/smbusiness/whos_stealing_piracy_legal.fsb.
47
See Eric Wilson, O.K., Knockoffs, This Is War, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at G1. The stories of
individual designers can be found at http://www.counterfeitchic.com.
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players, such as the National Retail Federation, do not take a public position due to a lack
of internal consensus on the issue. The academic world is also split. Professor Susan
Scafidi is a strong proponent of the DPPA 48 whilst Professor Sprigman and Professor
Ruastiala argue against it. 49 The lack of unity around the proposal raises questions about
the political economy of fashion. It might be true to a certain extent that the fashion
industry has thrived commercially without an explicit framework for intellectual property
protection, but it is also true that design piracy cuts into sales, tarnishes a brand’s
reputation and constitutes a major barrier for young designers trying to establish their
identity in the marketplace. 50 I will now assess which of these arguments should be given
greater weight.
1. Technological Advance
¶28

Early in the 20th century, the impact of copies of original fashion designs was more
modest. Designers enjoyed first mover rights by profiting from the exclusivity of their
designs before competitors could copy them at a cheaper cost. In that time gap, the
designers reaped generally high profits from their original designs, before moving to the
next trend. In this scenario, the time lag between when a design was launched and when
a copy could be reproduced would typically amount to several months, and the
competitive advantage gained by the original creator in those months might be the best
explanation on why the industry was able to thrive for so long without intellectual
property protection.
¶29
More recently, technological advances to the means of textile and garment
production eroded that advantage by enabling fast manufacturing in places with cheaper
labor. Especially for developing countries, design piracy is efficient and lucrative: pirates
copy designs from photographs of catwalks posted on the Internet and produce accurate
copies even before real items are introduced into the market. 51 It is also common for
copycats to send spies to showrooms and take photographs of the garments. 52 It is these
technological advances that increase the need for intellectual property protection. The
legal principle exempting fashion from copyright protection to encourage the growth of
the industry seems to be outdated in this era of sophisticated and instantaneous mass
copying. New technologies threaten designers’ ability to compete with the products of
lower cost countries, because the distribution of images of new designs and the
automation of copying and manufacturing occur in the blink of an eye. The days when
Coco Chanel would say “copying is the highest form of flattery” are now over—piracy
threatens the very existence of fashion designers. In many cases, costs will not be
recovered, and in the other cases only small margins will result from a severely limited
first mover dynamic.

48

Susan Scafidi, F.I.T: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69 (2008); see also
Scafidi, supra note 1.
49
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2006).
50
Robin Givhan, The End of 'Gown in 60 Seconds'?, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2007, at C02.
51
Teri Agins, Copy Shops: Fashion Knockoffs Hit Stores before Originals As Designers, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 1994, at A1.
52
MARY GEHLHAR, THE FASHION DESIGNER SURVIVAL GUIDE 248 (Kaplan Publishing 2d ed. 2008).
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Copying generates inefficiencies in the market which result in economic losses to
designers who are prevented from reaping a fair return on their investments. If costs are
not recovered, designers are forced to charge consumers higher prices. Proponents of the
bill have explained that one of the ideas behind it is to protect highly innovative designs
at a time when they are sold at high prices, so that the costs can be recovered by
prohibiting the sale of substantially similar items that would undercut the market. The
DPPA would guarantee a protection term of three years, which appears to be a modest
term calibrated to address the specific problem of cost recovery and granting a reasonable
expectation of exclusivity.
2. Split Markets

¶31

Landes and Posner suggest that copyright protection is not always necessary to
incentivize creators because there are several factors that would limit copying even in the
absence of copyright laws. 53 They argue that the inferior quality of a plagiarized copy
makes it an imperfect substitute for the real thing and that as a consequence there might
not be negative effects on the market. If this argument is taken and equally applied to the
fashion design industry context, the result would be that the markets for top-end fashion
and mass-market retailers would split because arguably no revenues are lost if consumers
would not pay money for the original item in the first place. The difficulty with this
argument, and Landes and Posner recognize it later on, is that the fact that some
customers of pirated copies would not have paid for the original item does not imply that
all of them would not have paid. 54 It is very difficult to ascertain the fraction of
consumers who bought the pirated item, but would have been willing to pay the higher
price of the original piece. 55
¶32
It might be true that original designs and copies address different market segments
and that therefore, designers do not lose customers and revenues, but this does not take
into consideration that copying can occur between parties at the same level of the fashion
industry. One example of this horizontal copying occurred when Yves Saint Laurent
successfully sued Ralph Lauren over a dinner jacket dress under French copyright law,
and was awarded $395,000. 56 No matter at what level of the pyramid the copying occurs,
as long as the parties are at the same level it is certain that someone will be hurt
economically.
¶33
Vulnerability to economic loss can materialize even when copying occurs between
different segments of the pyramid. Lately we have been witnessing a democratization of
style, that has shown that creative design does not only stem from haute couture fashion
houses, but it may originate from many different sources and at all price levels. Although
53

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 41 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003).
54
Id. at 47.
55
Id.
56
Societe Yves Saint Laurent Couture S.A. v. Societe Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt. S.A., [1994] E.C.C.
512, 514 (Trib. Comm. Paris); PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY, AND
THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE US ECONOMY 77 (Greenwood Publishing Group 1999) (“A French
court ruled in favor of Yves Saint Laurent for ‘counterfeiting and disloyal competition’ against Ralph
Lauren for copying a black tuxedo dress that was created in 1966. Saint Laurent was awarded $395,000 in
1994.”); see also Jennifer Mencken, Comment, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, 1997 B.C. INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. F. 121201 n.75 (1997).
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a lot of copying still involves retailers copying high-end designers, this trend is slowly
changing as some of the most aggressively copied designs are popularly priced. For
example, the Croc clogs for the summer and the Ugg boots for the winter have been
copied widely at every level of the pyramid. This emphasizes the need for design
protection for every level of the industry that makes use of creative endeavor.
¶34
In addition, within the past few years the threshold of creativity between different
levels of the pyramid has become blurred as high-end designers have shown an
increasing willingness to collaborate with large retailers through designer partnerships.
For example, Isaac Mizrahi has agreed to design for Target, Chanel designer Karl
Lagerfeld and Jimmy Choo created lines for H&M, Mark Eisen launched a sportswear
collection for Wal-Mart, and many others followed on the same track. 57 These
collaborations allow top-end designers to apply their creativity to more affordable
materials and the result is innovative design at a lower price, which means a greater
percentage of the consuming public can afford the designs. Given the weakness of the
current IP regime, the designers, high-end or not, remain unprotected whether they create
for Chanel or H&M. Accordingly, a change in copyright law to incorporate fashion
designs would enhance consumer welfare by increasing designers’ incentives to
disseminate their creative work cheaply. 58
¶35
In addition, notwithstanding the level at which the copying occurs, cheaper
imitations do dilute original couture designs rather than serving as an advertising tool to
the benefit of the designer. Congress recognized a dilution cause of action under
trademark law, and identified the harm associated with dilution as “the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of . . . likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” 59 Consumers
like the prestige that is conveyed by a trademark, by a design or by both of them together.
The industry suffers if a design becomes diluted, because its aspirational value drops.
Economic loss is not always present when the claim is one for dilution, sometimes
unauthorized copying has no direct economic impact, but nonetheless it lessens the
prestige and uniqueness of the product. This mirrors the Landes and Posner scenario
described above where the markets are separate because the plagiarized copy is of
inferior quality, but other times the dilution of a design can cut into sales, for instance
when a design is dropped by the industry when it becomes too widespread or associated
with a less exclusive image.
¶36
Tailored copyright protection would prevent dilution to a certain extent and it
would give high-end designers the means to make credible commitments about
separation to consumers who expect to get an exclusive product for the price they are
paying. This would leave the door open for derivative works 60—if designs are inspired
by existing works no infringement claims should be possible especially in an industry

57
See Adam Jones & Elizabeth Rigby, A Good Fit? Designers and Mass Market chains Try to Stitch
Their Fortunes Together, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005.
58
It may also be argued that an increase in legal protection covering designs would decrease consumer
welfare by allowing designers to charge higher prices due to the lack of competing alternatives. Which of
the effects predominates in practice is an empirical question which is outside the scope of this article.
59
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
60
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 53, at 109 (quoting Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative
Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209, 229 (1983)).
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where some level of cross-pollination is crucial to its workability. It turns out to be a
question of degree, an issue that I discuss later.
3. The Fashion Cycle of the Low IP Equilibrium
¶37

¶38

¶39

¶40

¶41

In a piece titled “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design” Professors Sprigman and Raustiala analyze the proposed legislation in
light of the fashion cycle maintenance, their own theory of interpretation of the fashion
industry. 61 According to them, legislation prohibiting design piracy is unnecessary
because the low intellectual property equilibrium and the resulting “reinterpretation,
derivative reworking and copying” of designs is part of the very nature of the industry
because it keeps the fashion cycle moving.
They bring forward an argument, “induced obsolescence,” which describes how
haute couture designers create fashion trends for a limited and exclusive clientele who
generate a consistent profit in the immediate future. When these high-end trends are then
reinterpreted by mass market designers to be sold at a cheaper price, haute couture
designers develop a subsequent distaste towards these cheap reinterpretations; “what is
initially chic can rapidly become tacky . . . as it diffuses into the broader public” 62 and it
is this distaste that spurs them to move on and create newer looks. This rapid spreading
of copied designs leading towards exhaustion suggests that copying does not hinder
creativity; on the contrary, it produces greater incentives to innovate among designers.
This leads to their second argument: copying and reinterpreting successful designs
helps “anchor” seasonal trends, which benefits the industry as a whole. Raustiala and
Sprigman see the equation “copying = contributing to the creation of a trend” as a key
element of the fashion economy. They claim that after being created by top-end
designers, trends have to be communicated by the rest of the fashion pyramid because it
is trends that drive the consumption of fashion: every season new trends come into being
because they appeal to the masses. 63
Both arguments are in line with the truth that fashion designs have a short life, that
people buy clothes to keep up with the latest style, and it is this that encourages designers
to move forward and create new looks, but it does not take into account the complexity of
the taste dependency of fashion. Sprigman takes it a step further by saying that the
industry has “developed an ecosystem that depends on copying,” 64 but even here, it is
difficult to see how the value of inciting people to conspicuous consumption can have
any social benefits.
It might be true that the phenomena identified above, which are peculiar to fast
moving industries, have allowed the industry to move on quickly, and that the
introduction of intellectual property protection has the potential of making the fashion
cycle slower and less trend-driven. Springman and Raustiala offer a comprehensive
analysis explaining why they perceive that the fashion industry as a whole works well
and continues to be creative, however a breaking point must be defined when
61

Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2006).
62
Id.
63
Mary Wood, Springman Urges Congress to Keep Fashion Copyright-Free, Virginia Law, News &
Events, July 31, 2006, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/sprigman.htm.
64
Id.
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“referencing” becomes “pirating.” The DPPA should be construed so that referencing is
permitted and pirating prohibited. The ability of creating a trend by being referenced is a
motive of flattery for designers, and since the proposed bill would apply to garments “as
a whole” it won’t prohibit original remixes. It is widely accepted that nothing is entirely
new or original in fashion design because the focus is on the re-contextualization and the
recycling of previous ideas. However, as mentioned above, the DPPA does not want to
reshape the prerogatives on which fashion design is grounded—it’s scope should be to
encompass literal copies only. Once a strict standard of interpretation has been agreed
on, the rhythm of the fashion cycle would not be disrupted.
4. The Piracy Business Model versus The Industry of “Young” Designers
¶42

The price of fashion at every level of the pyramid is justified by the time and effort
designers spend researching fabrics, ideas and techniques. 65 Becoming a fashion designer
takes years of training in design schools and as apprentices, large investments of money
for the development of new and unusual fabrics, not to mention the high expenses
associated with the marketing and the runway shows, which include models, samples,
photographers, stylists, space etc. Although it is to be noted that copyright law in the
U.S. has never recognized the “sweat of the brow” doctrine, 66 which states that someone
can gain IP rights through efforts expended in labor and not necessarily resulting in
original work, all this hard work must justify some sort of protection because originality
in this segment of the industry will generally be appreciated by the public only once the
hard work part has been satisfied. 67 It is not just the free ride on research costs that
justifies intellectual property protection in the fashion industry, but copiers also avoid the
deadweight loss 68 of the designs that turn out to be unpopular, but where resources have
been spent already. The absence of protection for fashion designs in the U.S. made the
economic position of young designers particularly vulnerable as companies with piracy
as a business model became widespread. These companies’ business is based on
warehousing cheap material and copying successful designs. They do not invest any
capital in paying designers since their designs can be freely appropriated anyway, and
saving on designers equals saving the costs listed above, mainly the ones associated with

65

Wilson, supra note 47.
Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
67
Design Law – Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries: Hearing on H.R. 2033
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Internet and Intellectual Property of H. Committee on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of William Delahunt, House Representative); id.
(statement of Narciso Rodriguez, Counsel of Fashion Designers); see also Susan Scafidi, Washington
Fashion Week 2: The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, COUNTERFEIT CHIC, Feb. 19, 2008,
http://www.counterfeit chic.com/2008/02/Washington_fashion_week_2_the.php (referring to Narcisco
Rodriguez’s statement, “[h]is very personal prepared statement told the story of a Cuban-American boy
who took out loans to attend Parsons and got his big break when he made a wedding gown for his dear
friend Carolyn Bessette's marriage to John F. Kennedy, Jr., only to see it copied nearly 8 million times. He
sold 40. Publicity may be nice, but it doesn't pay the bills.”).
68
In economic terms, a deadweight loss is a loss of economic efficiency that comes into play when the
equilibrium for products or services is not optimal and improvements can be made. For an accurate
definition of deadweight loss see HAL R.VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICRO ECONOMICS 431-34 (Norton
2006).
66
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the runway. They focus on the output and on maintaining low prices. As Scafidi put it,
“[t]he copyists are professionals, in the game for cash, not creativity.” 69
¶43
If the DPPA is passed, mass market retailers would face the peril of lawsuits being
filed over exceedingly similar copies and this will force them to hire designers, which
would benefit the public in two ways: more jobs and a richer choice of designs would be
on the market. Right now, the jobs that could employ young American designers are
sacrificed in favor of sweatshop labor in developing countries, where the copies are
manufactured. No wonder that emerging Asian economies are growing industries based
on copying, manufacturing and exporting American fashion designs as long as it is legal.
This piracy business model also hinders the export opportunities for America.
¶44
Knockoffs devalue designs to the point that wholesale orders are cancelled, 70 and
this is threatening for young designers especially. More settled designers rely on their
well-established trademarks as these are the essence of their revenues and profits,
because they are protected by anti-counterfeiting provisions. Alain Coblence, a lawyer
hired by the Council of Fashion Designers, gives voice to the legitimate concerns of
designers: “designers now must ask what is the incentive to innovate if you know your
creation is going to be stolen within days and your designs are going to be used before
you have a chance to use them for yourself?” And this goes back to the constitutional
intent of copyright law.
¶45
It has been questioned whether the DPPA is more concerned with protecting
creativity or luxury fashion houses with money. It is to a certain extent true that the top
slice of the fashion pyramid has better means to afford pursuit of legal actions for design
infringement, but the bill will also give a strong weapon to creative young minds who
come up with brilliant new ideas. It would be a massive improvement for every designer,
regardless of whether well-established or young, given that the status quo only allows for
custom recordal options and for the sending of a cease and desist letter trying to persuade
the infringing party with moral and uncertain legal arguments. 71 Cease and desist letters
based on the new legislation would contain compelling reasons to refrain from copying
and in the case of lawsuits, copiers will be likely to settle.

69

The copyists recognize that in certain instances, when the particular design falls in one of the
traditional intellectual property doctrines (discussed above) there are costs of copying—but these are
calculated beforehand, so that in the end it is still more convenient for them to pay the damages than to hire
designers. It must also be acknowledged that many companies who adopt this piracy business model, offer
a vast variety of choice of goods which have been copied from the most different sources, so that in the
eventuality of a lawsuit their whole business plan is not ruined.
70
Consider the example of Ananas, a relatively young (5-year-old) handbag label. Its co-founder, a
young wife and mother working from home in the suburbs of Washington successfully promoted her
handbags, which retailed between $200-$400. In 2006, she received a call cancelling a wholesale order.
The buyer explained that he found virtually identical copies of her bags at a lower price. Copies of her bags
were popular on the Internet, too. Ananas is still in business at present, but this loss of both wholesale and
retail sale was a significant blow to a small business.
71
It can also be argued that design protection is more important for young designers following the
argument made by Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, supra note 29 (“Luxury firms are already well
protected by the existing trademark and trade dress legal regime, brand investments, and the relatively
small overlap between markets for the original and for the copy. The main threat posed by copyists is to
innovation by smaller, less established, independent designers who are less protected along all of these
dimensions. Affording design protection would level the playing field with respect to protection from
copyists and allow more such designers to enter, create, and be profitable.”).
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The U.S. fashion industry is vibrant, but it is young. 72 The bill would defend young
designers who are not so well established and still vulnerable prey to mass market copiers
by giving them three years in which they can exploit their ideas in the marketplace by
themselves. It does not seem that this is asking Congress for too much. During the three
years of protection that the DPPA envisages, designers can decide to pursue design
patents for their most successful creations, if they want to seek continuing IP protection.
The businesses adopting the pirating strategies described above are lobbying against the
DPPA saying that the costs of facing lawsuits and the difficulty in obtaining financing
would drive them out of business. 73 This is not true, they will just be forced to adapt their
business model to the new intellectual property laws and employ more innovative young
designers instead of relying on piracy.
V. THE DPPA AND ITS SCOPE

¶47

Now that I have ascertained that there is harm and therefore, a need for a legislative
measure in this direction, I will evaluate if the proposed bill is satisfactory. If it creates a
successful mechanism that combats the harm caused by the copying that occurs at every
level.
¶48
The DPPA, if passed, would amend the section devoted to the “Protection of
Original Designs,” under Chapter 13 of Title 17 of the United States Code, which
currently protects vessel hulls, so as to include fashion designs. 74 Fashion designs would
receive protection for “the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its
ornamentation” with “apparel” defined to include “men’s, women’s, or children’s
clothing, including undergarments, outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear . . .
handbags, purses, and tote bags . . . belts and . . . eyeglass frames.” 75 The Register of
Copyrights would determine whether the purported design fits the category, and if it
does, then it will be registered. Damages for infringement can reach the amount of
$250,000 or $5 per copy, whichever is greater, and designers could eventually appeal for
the destruction of pirated goods. The envisaged term of protection is three years (nonrenewable) upon the earlier of the date of publication of the registration 76 or the date the
design is first made public. 77 Exempt from protection are fashion designs that were made
public more than three months prior to the filing of the registration application. The act
prohibits the making of closely and substantially similar copies of original work. Civil
actions can be brought against people who “make, have made, import, sell or distribute
any article embodying a design, which was created with knowledge or reasonable
grounds to believe that the design was protected and copied.” 78 The doctrines of
secondary infringement and secondary liability can be applied to actions related to
original designs. Importantly the bill does not apply retrospectively. Finally, if a claim
under other intellectual property categories is possible, it shall not be precluded.

72

Hearing, supra note 67 (statement of William Delahunt, House Representative).
Hearing, supra note 67 (statement of Steve Maiman, Stony Apparel Corp.).
74
17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2007).
75
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a)-(b) (2007).
76
17 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2007).
77
17 U.S.C. § 1310(b) (2007).
78
17 U.S.C. § 1308 (2007).
73
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A. Potential Problems of the DPPA
¶49

The legislation is far from perfect. The biggest paradox is that the DPPA extends
copyright protection to fashion designs without resolving questions concerning the
functionality barrier 79 to serve as a legislative exception to copyright’s utilitarian doctrine
as discussed above. 80 Also, many questions surrounding the actual scope of protection of
the Act could make enforcement complex.
1. Flexibility of Copyright Law

¶50

As we have seen above, the useful article doctrine of copyright law impedes the
protection of fashion designs under copyright law, notwithstanding whether the creative
expression is such as to make some of them adequate subject matter of copyright
protection. The current bill proposes to add “fashion design” under a general design
protection statute. Up to now, the copyright statute has allowed copyright protection of
useful articles and then restricted the definition of useful articles to vessel hulls. By
granting vessel hulls a sui generis, but copyright-like form of protection, copyright’s
useful articles rule was ignored and forms of expression compounded into useful objects
that could otherwise not have been protectable under copyright now are. It can be argued
that instead of ignoring a well-established doctrine that prohibits the protection of items
which serve a useful function, a better way to deal with the protection of fashion designs
could have been negotiated through the expansion of copyright protection.
¶51
A doctrinally more integral way to approach the protection of fashion designs
would be limiting the scope of the useful article rule, instead of eliminating it. This
happened already in 1990 with the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, 81
where Congress changed the application of the useful articles rule and extended copyright
protection to “built” architecture (architectural designs embodied in actual buildings)
without disturbing the broader coherence of copyright laws. As Congress has
demonstrated a willingness to be flexible in expanding Copyright laws with respect to
architecture, the same action could be taken with respect to fashion. This way Congress
would reverse the traditional presumptions of the useful articles doctrine instead of
eliding it.
2. The Standard of Orginality
¶52

Definitions in the DPPA are not specific enough in defining what designs would
merit copyright protection. The wording of the DPPA grants copyright protection to “the
appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its ornamentation” 82 and further
provides that “a design shall not be deemed to have been copied . . . if it is original and

79
2 JAY DRALTER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY § 1.02[5] (1991) (“The doctrine of functionality nicely separates he domain of trademarks from
that of utility patents by precluding trademark protection for any product feature that is dictated by its
utilitarian function.”).
80
Kamal Preet, Why America Needs a European Fashion Police, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 386,
390 (2008).
81
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
82
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(7) (2007).
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not closely and substantially similar in overall visual appearance to a protected design.” 83
Sometimes it might be difficult to determine originality because many designs are
inspired by existing designs and trends. There is a fine balance to be drawn if the fashion
industry is not to be stifled and more guidance is needed for the evaluation of
infringement as a whole in order to save the court the trouble of applying imprecise
standards.
¶53
It is clear from the Committee minutes that the bill is not trying to extend copyright
protection to trends; on the contrary, there was uniform agreement on the necessity of
protecting the development of specific styles. 84 The language used by the bill suggests
that only closely and substantially similar garments will be infringing. Some
commentators argue that the “substantially similar” standard is too broad and that a
“virtually identical” standard would be better. The latter would prohibit line-to-line
copying only and this would avoid different courts coming out with different definitions.
However, if the definition is restricted in this way, clever copyists would continue
copying by moving small details, such as a zipper or a button and argue that the new item
cannot be a virtually identical copy. The prohibition of identical or virtually identical
copies is too narrow and will not catch copies that have been modified only slightly,
whereas substantially similar copies may generate too much debate and prove to be costly
and unpredictable.
¶54
The substantially similar approach is a better standard because it is more flexible.
This would allow judges to be strict when comparing two designs, but at the same time it
would allow them to be able to outlaw copies that have been amended only slightly but
are in fact clear plagiarisms. The “substantially similar” standard works best if coupled
with a formalist approach. This way, only objectively close copies would be prohibited,
and safe and predictable interpretations would be possible. In case of doubt, courts
should be free to consult fashion industry experts, or other generally accepted standards
of the fashion community. 85
¶55
Prohibiting closely or substantially similar copies is consistent with the generally
applied standard in copyright law. With regards to literary or artistic work, copyright has
been clearly capable of allowing trends and styles and punishing plagiarism—why should
the same not work within the fashion industry? It is crucial that legal rights are only
given out to truly novel designs and only close copies should be prohibited. It is
expected that designers will register selectively and only non-commonplace designs will
secure protection. This will enable the bill to catch copies and allow trends—which is the
underlying intention of the bill.

83

Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957 § 2(c)-(d) (2007).
A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R.5055 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006).
85
The division in formalist, intentionalist and institutionalist approaches has been developed by
Professor Alfred Yen and its application to the standards set out by the DPPA has been developed by
Elizabeth Johnson. See Elizabeth F. Johnson, Comment, Defining Fashion: Interpreting the Scope of the
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 729 (2008).
84
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3. Adjudicative Powers
¶56

According to the bill the Copyright Office won’t take any position as to the merits
of a design; on whether it is sufficiently original or distinctive enough to enjoy
protection. The Copyright Office would only be in charge of making a determination as
to whether or not the application relates to a design which is subject to protection
according to the categories proposed by the bill.
¶57
Originality thresholds will be determined by courts of law, because they are
thought to be in a better position to weigh the evidence that will help them in making a
more informed determination. Ominous voices say that because of the wide-ranging
cross-pollination in the development of trends, identifying an original design is already
difficult for someone within the industry. Thus, how can we expect courts to get it right?
This would raise issues as to the fair enforcement of the Act.
¶58
The risk of broad interpretations of the DPPA is balanced by the traditionally
narrow and careful attitude of common law judges towards widely drafted legislation.
American judges would most probably refrain from libertarian moves when interpreting
the DPPA and stick to a more conservative reading. This can be safely assumed after
inspecting the overly careful attitude adopted in the case law involving the protection of
fashion designs under the current regime, as I explained above in section III.
4. Remedies
¶59

Also the scope of remedies should be revised; seeking $250,000 or $5 respectively
for infringement does not reflect the real injury occurring to a designer, the popularity of
the design, the speed with which it appears on the market, the ex ante costs incurred and
the profits made. Some kind of broader remedial flexibility is needed. 86
¶60
In addition, the bill would increase the overall damages available under Chapter 13.
A penalty of $250.000 would exceed the maximum award of statutory damages available
for copyright infringement, which amounts to $150,000 in cases of willful infringement.
There is some skepticism about whether the maximum award for infringement of a
protected design should exceed the maximum award for copyright infringement. In
addition, it is not clear whether the damages should be of compensatory nature only or if
the court is given discretion to make a determination as to what it thinks is just. 87 Clearer
guidance relating to the calculation and availability of damages is warranted.
VI. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DESIGN AND THE DPPA COMPARED
¶61

The European Community Design Protection Regulation, which became directly
applicable in all member states on March 6, 2002 created a unified design protection
system within the European Union. 88 The Regulation establishes a two tier protection
system: first through the automatic creation of the unregistered community design (UCD)
86

Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Design
Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305 (2007).
87
Hearing, supra note 67.
88
Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 O.J. (L 3, 1.2002, p. 1), amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 O.J. (L 386, 29.12.2006, p.14), available at
http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/pdf/6-02-CV-en.pdf.
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as from first disclosure of the design in the community and second, the protection of a
registered community design (RCD) through registration at the Office for Harmonization
in the Internal Market in Alicante (OHIM). 89 Both provide designers with exclusive
rights to use their designs in commerce, take legal actions against infringers, and claim
damages. The Community Design has equal effect throughout the EU so that
registrations, transfers, surrenders, invalidity actions, and prohibited use will have effect
in twenty-seven countries simultaneously. Because or despite this Regulation, Europe
remains the hub of haute couture. 90 Notably in many EU countries the Regulation works
in tandem with national laws protecting the national fashion industry and because of their
ongoing historical importance in the fashion design scene it comes as no surprise that the
French and the Italians have the most stringent national regimes. 91
¶62
The crucial difference between the design rights as set out in the DPPA and the
European Regulation is that the American system extends copyright protection to
incorporate design rights whilst the European system grants an exclusive and independent
right that does not interfere with other statutorily protected intellectual property rights.
Doctrinally, the latter approach is preferred as it is easier and more dynamic to rule on a
self-standing right than attempting an interpretation which has to take into consideration
the whole law on copyrights. European designs do not need to cover non-functional
products as long as the aesthetics are not entirely dictated by its function. It would be
more convenient for the U.S. to have an independent body of laws regulating the
protection of fashion designs so that the confrontation with the utilitarian doctrine is
avoided, but for the time being an extension to copyright protection seems an acceptable
solution.

89

Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market in Alicante, Spain, www.oami.europa.eu/ (last visited
on Mar. 16, 2010).
90
Preet, supra note 80, at 386.
91
UMA SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC,
INDUSTRIAL, AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGNS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF THE E.C. DESIGN
REGULATION, THE E.C. DESIGN DIRECTIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL DESIGN PROTECTION 13-010 (London:
Sweet & Maxwell 2000) Suthersanen notes that:
Registered design protection is available under Book 5 of the [French Intellectual
Property] Code. Due to the availability of copyright protection, the sui generis design law
has become something of a white elephant. Whether this position will change with the
implementation of the E.C. Directive remains to be seen as the latter does not attempt to
curtail the wide protection offered under the French copyright law.
Id. at 13-010. She also notes that:
French law has firmly adhered to the totally cumulative approach towards the
protection of designs and models since the 1940s. Under this approach, simultaneous
protection for designs is assured under both design and copyright laws. . . .
The Italian design law adopts a patent-style protection scheme for designs upon
registration, a design patent is conferred on the applicant. . . .
The [Italian] design patent lawyer is granted an exclusive right to use his design. The
initial term of protection is fifteen years from the day following the filing of the
application. . . .
Id. at 13-012, 15-054, 15-054; see also Scafidi, supra note 1, at 118 (“France has the world’s strongest
legal protections for fashion design, and Paris remains the world’s fashion capital.”).
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A. Registered Community Design
¶63

Applying for a RCD is easy and affordable. One application in one language and
one fee payment 92 to OHIM is enough in order to gain EU wide protection. The RCD
lasts five years and can be renewed up to an additional four times, which grants a
maximum protection of twenty-five years. The design right proposed by the DPPA is
similar to the RCD but with the shorter duration of three years.
¶64
What is different is that with the RCD there is no upper limit to the number of
designs in one application, 93 which means that a single application can contain multiple
designs. Although it is not imperative that the designs bear relation to each other, this is
useful if a collection of similar clothing designs is being launched on the market. A
revised version of the DPPA should take this into consideration.
¶65
Another difference concerns the time lag between the placing of a design on the
market and registration. In the EU, publication in the Community Design Bulletin 94 can
be deferred on request and there is a twelve month grace period. Grace period means that
disclosure of the design either with or without the will of the owner is not taken into
account to assess novelty or individual character of a claim if it has happened “during the
12 months period preceding the date of filing of the application or, if priority is claimed,
the date of priority.” 95 This means that if the success of a design is uncertain, the
designer can test the market for a year and enjoy unregistered design rights before
seeking a RCD. Applications for design rights under the DPPA can be filed within three
months from the launch of the design, which in many instances is not enough to test the
success of a design.
B. Unregistered Community Design
¶66

The DPPA does not envision the possibility of unregistered design protection
which is in fact the Herculean weapon in the European design battlefield. In order to
enjoy UCD protection, all that is needed is to make the design available to the public
within the Community. Disclosure to the public does not exclusively mean availability
on the market, but also its presentation at trade exhibitions, fairs or advertisement in
various media. The UCD lasts for three years from first disclosure. The unregistered
design can be a very powerful tool for fashion businesses that regularly launch far
ranging collections into the market and do not have enough resources to keep up with
registrations. Especially in the fashion industry, the length of the protection provided is
not as important as the need to dispense with formalities and expenses of registering
designs pre-launch. It is also often difficult to predict which designs will be successful
and consequently copied. The main difficulty with the UCD is proving the existence of
92

Registration fees for one design are €230 plus €120 for publication, attorney costs will usually not
exceed €700, but additional costs can come into play if extra drawings or photographs are to be submitted
with the application.
93
As long as they belong to the same Locarno class, but each design application has to be paid for
individually.
94
See Community Designs Bulletin, EU Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market,
http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/bull.htm (last visited on Feb. 23, 2010).
95
Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 O.J. (L 3, 1.2002, p. 1), amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 O.J. (L 386, 29.12.2006, p.14) ART 5,
§1(b).
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the right, but once the necessary legal grounds for protection can be made out, the right
becomes extraordinarily useful in the fashion industry where turnovers are high and
designs have only a seasonal life. The DPPA does not envisage unregistered designs, and
this is unfortunate because it seems that the protection afforded by it bears a much more
realistic application to the way the fashion industry works. Unregistered design rights
should be included in the DPPA if a comprehensive system is to be put in place.
C. Threshold for the Protection of the RCD and the UCD
¶67

The common elements of the two types of protection available under the
Regulation include their unitary character, definitions and their scope of protection.
“Design” is defined as “the appearance of the whole or part of the product resulting from
its features and, in particular, the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture and/or materials
of the product itself and/or its ornamentation.” 96 There are two requirements for design
protection: novelty and individual character. A design is new if no identical design has
previously been made available to the public and it is considered to have individual
character if the overall impression produced by it on the informed user differs from the
overall impression made by any design previously available to the public.
¶68
The definitions are more accurately articulated in the European legislation.
European designs will be protected only once proof of novelty and individual character
can be shown, as opposed to the proposed American legislation that does not define the
specifics of originality but only adds that it should not be “closely and substantially
similar in overall visual appearance to a protected design.” 97 Unsurprisingly, the
comprehensiveness of the definitions in the European Regulations trace back to a civil
law approach whilst common law countries rely less on definitions and more on
convention and judicial restraint. Although U.S. judges are likely to rule as severely even
in the absence of detailed legal specifications, awareness of the European definitions
might provide useful analytical tools against which to test an American design.
D. Case Law in Europe
¶69

Some American pundits like to argue that despite such powerful and efficient tools,
there has not been much case law relating to the enforcement of the registered and
unregistered European Designs.
This fact is exploited to maintain that the
underutilization of EU protection evidences the efficiencies accruing with a low IP
environment, but this is a misconception. The reason why case law has been scarce is
because parties usually reach confidential settlements in this area of law, which are made
public only in the most blatant circumstances. For example, Jimmy Choo received over
£80,000 in compensation from NewLook, which was forced to withdraw thousands of
“Bonbon” shoes from the market following threatened legal action, and Chloe received
around £12,000 from Topshop who plagiarized its lemon yellow dungaree dress. 98 None
96

Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 O.J. (L 3, 1.2002, p. 1), amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 O.J. (L 386, 29.12.2006, p.14) ART 3(a).
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17 U.S.C. §1309 (e) (2007).
98
Dan Newling, Thousands of £20 High Street Bags Trashed for Looking too Similar to a £650 Jimmy
Choo, THE DAILY MAIL, Nov. 12, 2007; Emil Dugan, Topshop Ordered to Destroy Dresses 'Copied from
Chloé Design', THE INDEPENDENT, July 27, 2007; Martin Beckforth, Topshop Destroys its 'Chloé' Dresses,
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of these cases made it to court, and this highlights the importance of the very recent
Karen Millen and Jimmy Choo cases in laying down precedents for registered and
unregistered design protection. These latter cases further illustrate how judges set a
threshold for protection and that unregistered rights are of inestimable importance in this
branch of the industry.
1. Karen Miller
¶70

Karen Millen won a landmark victory against Dunnes Stores, an Irish retailer, after
long-lasting court hearings in Dublin’s commercial court. 99 Karen Millen claimed that
Dunnes Stores had directly copied three unregistered designs of ladies’ clothing. It was
clear from the evidence that was brought forward that it was the intention of the
defendant to copy those designs. The crux was whether Karen Millen’s designs qualified
for UCD protection, whether they could be considered “new” and with “individual
character.” The designs were held to be new because no identical ones had been
previously available on the market. By determining whether the design had individual
character, the court had to decide whether the overall impression it produced on the
informed user differed from that produced by the existing body of designs available on
the market. Ms. Justice Mary Finlay Geoghean defined an informed user as “a woman
with a keen sense of fashion, a good knowledge of designs of women’s tops and shirts
previously made available to the public, alert to design and with a basic understanding of
any functional or technical limitations on designs for women’s tops and shirts.”
Although the defendants had identified and submitted a number of prior designs that
contained elements of the Karen Millen designs, the judge held that there was great scope
for variation in the previous designs and therefore the overall impression of the disputed
items on the notional informed user clearly differed from the prior art. Thus, Karen
Millen was held to possess valid unregistered Community Design rights that it could
enforce against Dunnes. Delivery of all infringing items and an accounting of profits
made in respect to the sales of the infringing items were ordered. Dunnes has reportedly
appealed and two further cases dealing with similar issues have been adjourned pending
the outcome of this appeal. 100 The results are anxiously awaited in the industry.
2. Jimmy Choo

¶71

In January 2008, Jimmy Choo brought an action against retailer Towerstone for
infringing registered and unregistered design rights in its Ramona bag. 101 The court
found that Towerstone’s handbag infringed Jimmy Choo’s Community Registered
Design, because, in essence, from the overall impression the “informed user” would
THE TELEGRAPH, July 26, 2007; Tenisha Anderson, Topshop. More like Copy-shop., IPAPIER, July 27,
2007.
99
Karen Millen Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores, [2007] I.E.H.C. 449 (H.Ct., 21st December, 2007) (Ir.) available
at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2007/H449.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); see Margaret Tofalides
& Lauren Orakwusi, Fashion Victim: Clothing Copycat Victory Under EU Design Regulations,
COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 2008, at 13.
100
Whistles and Coast have brought actions against Dunnes stores too.
101
J Choo (Jersey) Ltd. v. Towerstone Ltd., [2008] E.W.H.C. 346 (H.Ct., 16th January, 2008) (U.K.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/346.html; see Simon Clark & Gavin
Llewellyn, Innocence Defence Goes Out of Fashion, COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 2008, at 13.
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regard two handbags as being the same. In addition, the Court held that Choo’s
unregistered design right had been infringed. For infringement to be found, the
infringing design must have copied the unregistered design. The Court found that the
number of similarities between the two handbags was such that the only explanation was
that the Towerstone handbag was a copy.
VII.

FINAL COMMENTS

¶72

In a world where simultaneous copying rages and piracy has become a business
model, legislation addressing fashion designers’ rights is a necessary addition to U.S.
intellectual property law and a fair complement to anti-counterfeiting measures. The
DPPA is designed to protect innovative designers and ensure that they gain benefits from
their intellectual investments. This is the very basis of intellectual property protection,
and it should be applied to the fashion industry at a very basic level. If anti-piracy
legislation passes, it would be a first step towards an international alignment of design
rights and it would provide a basis for a more global enforcement. Lawyer Alain
Coblence, hired by fashion trade groups in Milan and Paris, said that the impetus for
lobbying Congress came from meetings with French and Italian designers who wanted
comparable legal standards to apply in the U.S. 102 There is a fear that the fashion design
industry would start to migrate to Europe if no action is taken.
¶73
The DPPA would grant a weaker protection than its European counterpart. Much
can be done to improve it, for instance the inclusion of a reduced protection term for
unregistered design rights, but once it undergoes a few modifications it constitutes a fair
effort to protect and encourage both young and established haute couture designers.
Importantly the DPPA has to be understood as a measure sensitive to the industry’s
innovative culture—it does not want to inhibit designers from interpreting ideas that
make out a trend. Once the scope of protection of the Act is clarified and once it is
acknowledged that only unique designs enjoy protection and that only very close copying
would be prohibited, the DPPA will be an overall appropriate and balanced measure, and
with its short-term, narrowly crafted protection for the fashion industry, it proves that
copyright law can be construed to serve the interest of both, creators and the public. 103 It
will recognize that part of the nature of fashion is cross-pollination and mass marketers
could still produce goods inspired by designer collections. Within this scenario,
consumers will retain the right to be stylishly dressed at affordable prices and fashion
design would get more respect as a creative endeavor worth defending.
¶74
Like in Europe, the bill is meant as a deterrent, rather than an inducement to file
lawsuits. Potentially the most dangerous variable is the well-known American keenness
towards litigation. 104 It is hard to predict how this historical tradition coupled with U.S.
free trade culture will play out this time, but the DPPA has the potential of being a
102

Wilson, supra note 47.
Hearing, supra note 67 (Statement of Susan Scafidi, Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School) (“So
H.R. 5055, with its short-term, narrowly tailored protection for the fashion industry is, I think, a
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Hearing, supra note 67 (Statement of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of
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narrowly tailored measure reflecting the unique seasonality of the fashion industry and it
can be safely assumed that the American judicial attitude towards narrow interpretations
will prohibit only very close copying. If the standards are kept high, the danger of
frivolous lawsuits is non-existent and trends will be safeguarded. It is true that legal
standards have to converge in order to be able to do business and discourage piracy in a
more globalised world but it would be a mistake not to be culturally sensitive to reactions
of different countries.
¶75
Opponents of the DPPA assert that the American fashion industry is thriving as a
massive $310 billion business and regularly ask, why fix something that is not broken? 105
The answer is plain: to act proactively to prevent it from breaking down. The low IP
equilibrium is likely to fall under the pressure of technological advancement and the
subsequent shift in the scale of production, and this makes a strong case for a limited and
specific form of intellectual property protection for fashion design. The legislation has
momentum because the fear of free-riding feeds the appetite for intellectual property
expansion. Furthermore, once satiated the fashion industry may thrive even more.

105
This is the underlying thesis of Sprigman and Raustiala’s paper, see Raustiala & Sprigman, supra
note 61, and the question also came up in the testimony of Steve Maiman, see Hearing, supra note 67
(Statement of Steve Maiman, Stony Apparel Corp.).
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